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Comment
A DEATH SENTENCE FOR JUSTICE: THE FEENEY AMENDMENT
FRUSTRATES FEDERAL SENTENCING
I. INTRODUCTION
Sentencing might be a judge's most important role in which the use
of discretion is both warranted and necessary. While only judges are
uniquely qualified on the subject of sentencing, recent legislation suggests
that Congress feels judges are incapable ofjudging. 1 The Feeney Amend-
ment of the Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Against the Exploitation of
Children Today Act ("PROTECT Act") 2 will eviscerate a very crucial part
of the sentencing process-downward departures.3 By limiting a judge's
discretion or willingness to order sentences below those provided by the
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines ("Guidelines"), defendants are no longer
treated on a case-by-case basis, but rather are given a "one size fits all"
approach to justice.4 This draconian approach to sentencing will likely
have an adverse impact throughout the system by frustrating its function-
ing actors-not only the judges, but also defense attorneys, prosecutors
1. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 404 (1989) (qualifying judiciary
as proper entity to sentence). U.S. Supreme CourtJustice Kennedy commented
that the "trial judge is the only actor in the system most experienced with exercis-
ing discretion in a transparent, opened, and reasoned way." Justice Anthony M.
Kennedy, Address at the American Bar Association Annual Meeting 5 (Aug. 9,
2003) [hereinafter Kennedy Address] (addressing inadequacies and injustices of
prison system). Justice Kennedy then requested, "Please do not use our courts but
then say the judge is incapable of judging." Id. (urging Congress to reconsider
new legislation that nearly strips judges of discretion at sentencing).
2. See Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Against the Exploitation of Children
Today Act (PROTECT Act), Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401, 117 Stat. 650, 667-76 (2003)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553, 3742 (2003); 28 U.S.C. §§ 994, 991
(2003)) (containing controversial "Feeney Amendment" or "Feeney"). The
phrases "PROTECT Act" and "Feeney Amendment" are often used interchangea-
bly to refer to this controversial legislation. For a discussion of the origin of the
Feeney Amendment, see infra notes 34-46 and accompanying text.
3. See Letter from Frank 0. Bowman III et al. to Senators Orrin G. Hatch and
Patrick Leahy, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate 1 (Apr. 2, 2003) (on file
with author) [hereinafter Letter from Bowman] (expressing law professors' con-
cern with Feeney Amendment).
4. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553, 3742 (providing circumstances limiting or proscrib-
ingjudicial discretion); 28 U.S.C. §§ 994, 991 (same); see also Mark H. Allenbaugh,
Who's Afraid of the Federal Judiciary? Why Congress'Fear ofJudicial Sentencing Discretion
May Undermine a Generation of Reform, 27 CH-AMPION 6, 9 (2003) (citing Letter from
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL) to Congressional Rep-
resentatives (Apr. 9, 2003)).
(693)
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and the U.S. Sentencing Commission ("Commission").5 The result of this
collective frustration could lead to the ultimate demise of the system.
This Comment discusses the practice of federal sentencing, the im-
pact the Feeney Amendment will have on ajudge's ability to use discretion
and the effect on other actors in the sentencing process. Part II summa-
rizes the contemporary federal sentencing system. 6 Part III addresses the
enactment of recent legislation adverse to the sentencing system. 7 Part IV
details the Feeney Amendment's effect on judicial discretion in sentenc-
ing.8 Part V focuses on the impact the new sentencing rules will have on
different actors in the criminal justice system.9 Part VI discusses the posi-
tive impact of the PROTECT Act on child protection law.' 0 Finally, Part
VII highlights and encourages efforts to repeal the controversial legisla-
tion so the Guidelines can, if needed, be redrafted in a reasoned and in-
formed way.'1 While the Guidelines may not be perfect, taking away a
judge's ability to consider the particular circumstances of a defendant and
the crime is not the answer. 12 The Feeney Amendment is potentially a life
sentence for judicial discretion and a death sentence for justice.
5. See, e.g., Jonathon Groner, Federal Judiciary Opposes Sentencing Change, LEGAL
TIMES, Aug. 25, 2003, at 8 (discussing frustration with limitingjudicial discretion of
federal judiciary). At a hearing of the U.S. Sentencing Commission on August 19,
2003, "the federal judiciary formally voiced its opposition to a directive from Con-
gress that the panel reduce the number of 'downward departures' in criminal sen-
tencing." Id. (noting opposition); see also Letter from Jon M. Sands, Chair, Federal
Defenders' Sentencing Guidelines Subcommittee, to The Honorable Diana E.
Murphy, Chair, U.S. Sentencing Commission (Apr. 25, 2003) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Letter from Sands] (detailing frustration by defense attorneys be-
cause "li]n [their] experience, downward departures are working as intended by
Congress-preserving some fairness and individualized sentencing within the guide-
lines system").
6. For a discussion of the development of federal sentencing, see infra notes
13-33 and accompanying text.
7. For a discussion of the enactment of the PROTECT Act, see infra notes 34-
46 and accompanying text.
8. For a discussion of the Feeney Amendment's effects on a judge's role in
sentencing, see infra notes 47-86 and accompanying text.
9. For a discussion of the Feeney Amendment's influence on defense attor-
neys, prosecutors and the U.S. Sentencing Commission, see infra notes 87-135 and
accompanying text.
10. For a discussion of the effect of the Amendment on child protection laws,
see infra notes 136-55 and accompanying text.
11. For an overview of efforts to repeal the legislation and a forecast of the
Feeney Amendment's impact, see infra notes 156-78 and accompanying text.
12. SeeJohn S. Martin,Jr., Let Judges Do TheirJobs, N.Y. TiMES,June 24, 2003, at
A31 ("For a judge to be deprived the ability to consider all of the factors that go
into formulating ajust sentence is completely at odds with the sentencing philoso-
phy that has been the hallmark of the American system of justice."); see also Ken-
nedy Address, supra note 1, at 5 ("The Federal Sentencing Guidelines [themselves]
should be revised downward.").
[Vol. 49: p. 693
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II. HISTORY OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
Judges once enjoyed broad discretion in determining whether and
for howlong to incarcerate an offender. 13 This discretion led to percep-
tions that "federal judges mete out an unjustifiably wide range of
sentences to offenders with similar histories, convicted of similar crimes,
committed under similar circumstances." 14 In response, and after years of
tailoring, Congress adopted the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.15
Congress intended the Sentencing Reform Act to eliminate unwar-
ranted sentencing disparity by establishing a consistent system of federal
sentencing. 16 Consequently, Congress created the U.S. Sentencing Com-
13. See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 92 (1996) (providing background
of federal judicial sentencing discretion).
14. Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 98-225, at 38 (1983)). Throughout history, many
legal scholars have expressed their distrust in the discretionary powers of judges.
See, e.g., JAMES F. SIMON, WHAT KIND OF NATION 9 (2002) (quoting Letter from
ThomasJefferson to Spencer Roane (Mar. 9, 1821)). For example, Thomas Jeffer-
son wrote that "[t]he great object of my fear is the federal judiciary. That body,
like gravity, ever acting with noiseless foot & unalarming advance, [is] gaining
ground step by step .... Let the eye of vigilance never be closed." Id. (expressing
distrust in judicial discretion). Likewise, Lord Camden noted:
[T]he discretion of ajudge is the law of tyrants; it is always unknown; it is
different in different men; it is casual, and depends upon constitution,
temper and passion. In the best it is oftentimes caprice; in the worst, it is
every vice, folly and passion to which human nature can be liable.
State v. Cummings, 36 Mo. 263, 278 (1865), rev'd, 71 U.S. 277 (1867) (concerning
ex post facto law). Over a century later, Justice Ben F. Overton of the Florida Su-
preme Court commented:
Some writers and authorities have said that the term "judicial discretion"
is a mistake or misnomer. The term "discretion" in its English usage
means "with restraint." In the broad legal sense, however, judicial discre-
tion denotes a very real grant of power that can be the absolute and final
authority in any given situation.
Justice Ben F. Overton, The Meaning of Judicial Discretion, in J. EIc SMITHBURN,
JUDICIAL DISCRETION 3 (1980) (analyzing judicial discretion in functional context).
15. See 18 U.S.C §§ 3551-59, 3561-66, 3571-74, 3581-86 (2003) (establishing
particularized standards within which convicted federal offenders shall be sen-
tenced in conformity); 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-98 (2003) (same).
16. See generally Kirby D. Behre & Jeff Ifrah, Perspectives on Federal Sentencing
Guidelines and Mandatory Sentencing: Foreword: You Be the Judge: The Success of Fifteen
Years of Sentencing Under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 5
(2003) (citing S. REP. No. 98-225, at 39 (1983), which describes legislative history
of Sentencing Reform Act and goals of legislation). The Sentencing Reform Act
was the product of years of drafting and discussions to make the Act most ade-
quately fulfill the goals of sentencing. See generally Statements of Senators Edward
M. Kennedy and Patrick Leahy Supporting the JUDGES Act, in 15 FED. SENTENC-
INC REP. 372 (2003). Senator Edward M. Kennedy noted:
The Sentencing Reform Act was the result of extraordinary bipartisan co-
operation. In the Senate Judiciary Committee, over a ten-year period,
Senator Thurmond, Senator Hatch, Senator Biden, and I worked with
the Carter and Reagan Administrations to strike the best balance between
the goal of consistent sentencing in federal law and the need to give fed-
eral judges discretion to make sentences fit the crime in individual cases.
There was also strong bipartisan cooperation in the House Judiciary Coin-
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mission to establish such a system through the development of a compre-
hensive set of sentencing guidelines.1 7 The Commission promulgated the
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 18 in 1988, which specify an appropriate sen-
tencing range for each class of convicted persons based on various factors
related to the offender and the offense. 1 9
While the Guidelines were developed to regulate the discretion of
judges, Congress struck a careful balance between the goals of sentencing
uniformity and individualized justice.20 Congress recognized that the
Commission could not possibly anticipate and weigh every relevant varia-
ble that could arise in each case. 21 Accordingly, Congress granted judges
the authority to sentence outside the prescribed range if a judge finds "an
aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not ade-
mittee, and we worked together over several years to enact a strong, bal-
anced, and bipartisan bill.
Id. (quoting Senator Kennedy to show extensive research went into adoption of
Sentencing Reform Act).
17. See 28 U.S.C. § 991 (a) (creating U.S. Sentencing Commission). The Com-
mission is an independent agency within the judicial branch consisting of seven
members appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. See id. (detail-
ing composition of Commission); id. § 994 (charging Commission with developing
Guidelines).
18. See Behre & Ifrah, supra note 16, at 5 (noting original version of Guide-
lines implemented). The current version of the Guidelines is the product of over
six hundred amendments over the past fifteen years and is more than five hundred
pages in length. See id. (comparing original version to current one). Sentencing
guidelines are not usually amended because of Commission research or its review
of flaws within the Guidelines. See PaulJ. Hofer & Mark H. Allenbaugh, Perspectives
on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and Mandatory Sentencing: The Reason Behind the
Rules: Finding and Using the Philosophy of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 40 AM.
CRiM. L. REv. 19, 28 (2003) (noting different reason for amendments). The
Guidelines are, however, often amended because Congress frequently directs the
Commission to increase sentences for a particular crime when a crime receives
media attention. See id. (evaluating philosophy of Guidelines).
19. See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 92 (1996) (quoting U.S. SENTENC-
ING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, at 1 (1995)). The Guidelines require a dis-
trict judge to impose on a defendant in the typical case a sentence falling within
the applicable Guideline range. See id. (noting operation of Guidelines). Judges
use a grid that sets up presumptive sentences according to the seriousness of the
offense and the defendant's criminal history. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANuAL ch.5, pt. A (2003) (giving model of guideline grid through "Sentencing
Table"); see also Frank 0. Bowman III, When Sentences Don't Make Sense, WASH. POST,
Aug. 15, 2003, at A27 (describing procedure for determining sentences).
20. See Letter from Bowman, supra note 3, at 1 (noting purpose of Guidelines
was to preserve individualized sentencing). Over seventy law professors, most of
whom specialize in criminal law, signed a letter supporting this position. See id.
(expressing "deep concerns" regarding legislation to eviscerate judicial discretion
through granting of downward departures); see also Allenbaugh, supra note 4, at 9
(acknowledging objective to "bring some rationality and coherence to the sentenc-
ing process while still allowing for individualized sentences where circumstances
warrant").
21. See Letter from Bowman, supra note 3, at I (noting rational reason for
allowing Guideline departures); see also Koon, 518 U.S. at 92-93 (describing neces-
sity for ability to depart from sentencing ranges).
[Vol. 49: p. 693
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quately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formu-
lating the [G]uidelines. ' ' 22 If the judge finds an unusual case outside the
"heartland" of typical cases the Commission considered and the Guide-
lines describe, the court may consider whether a departure is warranted. 23
The Commission provided only a few factors that could never be a
basis for departure and chose not to limit the considerations that might
influence a decision to depart from the Guidelines. 24 The Commission
reasoned that departure factors "cannot, by their very nature, be compre-
hensively listed and analyzed in advance." 25 Further, departures will not
occur often because the Guidelines seek to take into account those factors
that made a significant difference in pre-Guideline sentencing.2 6
22. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (2003) (permitting sentencing outside prescribed
Guideline range when aggravating or mitigating factor exists); see also Koon, 518
U.S. at 92 (addressing discretion permitted to district courts). In Koon, the Su-
preme Court found:
The Act did not eliminate all of the district court's discretion, however.
Acknowledging the wisdom, even the necessity, of sentencing procedures
that take into account individual circumstances ... Congress allows for
district courts to depart from the applicable Guideline range if "the court
finds there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or
to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing
Commission in formulating the guidelines should result in a sentence
different from that described."
Id. (same).
23. See U.S. SENTENCING GUmELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt.
(1995) (describing Guideline application in typical cases). The Introduction to
the Guidelines explains:
The Commission intends the sentencing courts to treat each guideline as
carving out a "heartland," a set of typical cases embodying the conduct
that each guideline describes. When a court finds an atypical case, one to
which a particular guideline linguistically applies but where conduct sig-
nificantly differs from the norm, the court may consider whether a depar-
ture is warranted.
Id. (introducing circumstance warranting proper departure consideration). To
determine whether the Commission adequately considered a circumstance, courts
must consider only the Guidelines, policy statements and the Commission's official
commentary. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (instructing considerations for determining
typical case); see also Koon, 518 U.S. at 92-93 (discussing circumstances warranting
departure).
24. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES §§ 5H1.10, 5H1.12, 5H1.14, 5K2.12
(2003) (prohibiting departure based on numerous factors: race, sex, national ori-
gin, creed, religion, socioeconomic status, lack of guidance as youth, drug or alco-
hol dependence and economic hardship); see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt. 4(b) (1995) ("[These Guidelines do] not
intend to limit the kinds of factors, whether or not mentioned anywhere else in the
[G]uidelines, that could constitute grounds for departure in an unusual case.").
25. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt. 4(b)
(1995) (noting departure factors cannot be listed exclusively).
26. See id. (recognizing difficulty in prescribing single set of Guidelines to en-
compass "vast range of human conduct potentially relevant to sentencing deci-
sion"). The Commission noted that it is empowered to write and rewrite
Guidelines, and over time, it can refine Guidelines to specify more precisely which
departures should be permitted. See id. (describing reasoning for not including
5
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The U.S. Supreme Court has encouraged the exercise of legislative
discretion in promulgating sentencing schemes. 27 The Court recognized,
however, that the Eighth Amendment prohibits sentences that are dispro-
portionate to the crimes committed and enforces the constitutional princi-
ple of proportionality.28 Accordingly, in Koon v. United States,29 the Court
approved the use of downward departures, the adjustment of a sentence
below that suggested by the Guidelines." ° Downward departures, the
listed consideration factors); see also Koon, 518 U.S. at 93-94 (citing to U.S. Sentenc-
ing Guidelines Manual).
27. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 286 (1983) (discussing principle of pro-
portionality in sentencing).
28. See id. (holding constitutional principle of proportionality in sentencing
"has been recognized explicitly in this Court for almost a century"); see also Al-
lenbaugh, supra note 4, at 7 (discussing Supreme Court's views on punishment).
Despite the Court's holding in Solem, recent case law suggests that a majority of the
Court is:
[C]ontent to provide legislatures with discretion, effectively unfettered by
the Eighth Amendment, to promulgate even the most draconian of sen-
tencing schemes. Indeed, at least two of the Justices-Scalia and
Thomas-believe that the Eighth Amendment applies only to the mode of
imposing a sanction, not to its severity: "In [our] view, the Cruel and Unu-
sual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment contains no propor-
tionality principle."
Id. (emphasis in original) (citing Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 38 (2003)
(Thomas, J., concurring)).
29. 518 U.S. 81 (1996).
30. See id. (holding downward departures are appropriate where case falls
outside "heartland" of cases considered by Guidelines). While Koon was largely
concerned with interpreting the Sentencing Reform Act, the Eighth Amendment
was most likely not the prime motivator for the decision. See generally id. (noting
connection between Koon and Eighth Amendment is reaching). In Koon, Los An-
geles police officers were acquitted on state charges of assault and use of excessive
force in the beating of suspect Rodney King during his arrest. See id. at 85-91
(describing facts). As a result of the acquittal, widespread rioting and looting oc-
curred in Los Angeles where "[m]ore than 40 people were killed in the riots, more
than 2,000 injured, and nearly $ 1 billion in property was destroyed." Id. at 88
(recording damage done by citizens' outrage at acquittal of police officers). The
police officers were convicted under federal law for violating 18 U.S.C. § 242. See
id. at 88 (noting conviction of willfully using unreasonable force in making arrest
and willfully permitting officers to use such force). The applicable Guideline
range was section 2H1.4 of the 1992 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, indicating a sen-
tence of seventy to eighty-seven months. See id. at 89 (calculating appropriate
points that put King in said range). The district court granted one departure
downward based on the victim's misconduct and provocation, and a second depar-
ture based on a combination of factors: officers were unusually susceptible to
abuse in prison, officers would lose their jobs, they had a low risk of recidivism and
they had been subject to successive state and federal prosecutions. See id. at 88-90
(detailing decision to depart). The sentencing range after departure was thirty to
thirty-seven months, and the court sentenced the officers to thirty months. See id.
at 90 (stating sentence rendered). The Ninth Circuit reviewed the departures de
novo and reversed. See id. (reversing district court's departures). The Supreme
Court held the appropriate standard of review was abuse of discretion and af-
firmed in part and reversed in part. See id. at 91 (finding appropriate question to
review was whether sentencing court abused its discretion). The Court remanded
to the district court to consider only valid factors. See id. at 113-14 ("When a re-
[Vol. 49: p. 693
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Court determined, are "entirely consistent with the philosophy of the
Guidelines-which is to impose punishment that is deserved, and not arbi-
trary."3 I The Court found that the Commission provided significant gui-
dance in the Guidelines as to what factors should or should not be
considered bases for departure. 3 2 In addition, the Court noted that courts
must keep "in mind the Commission's expectation that departures based
on grounds not mentioned in the Guidelines will be 'highly
infrequent.'
33
viewing court concludes a district court based a departure on both valid and inva-
lid factors, a remand is required unless it determines the district court would have
imposed the same sentence absent reliance on the invalid factors.").
31. Mark H. Allenbaugh, The PROTECT Act's Sentencing Provisions, and the At-
torney General's Controversial Memo: An Assault Against the Federal Courts (Aug. 13,
2003), at http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/legislation/ci_03-41?OpenDocument
[hereinafter Controversial Memo] (discussing necessity for downward departures);
see also Koon, 518 U.S. at 92 (holding departures necessary because individual cir-
cumstances should be taken into account).
32. See Koon, 518 U.S. at 94-96 ("The Commission provides considerable gui-
dance as to the factors that are apt or not apt to make a case atypical, by listing
certain factors as either encouraged or discouraged bases for departure."). Factors
that are encouraged are those that the Commission was not able to fully take into
account in formulating the Guidelines. See id. at 94 (quoting section 5K2.0 of U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines and providing examples of encouraged factors). Even en-
couraged factors will not always be grounds for departure if "on some occasions
the applicable Guideline took the encouraged factor into account." Id. at 94-95
(giving example of upward departure for disruption of government "ordinarily
would not be justified when the offense of conviction is an offense such as bribery
or obstruction ofjustice; in such cases interference with a governmental function is
inherent in the offense"). A court may depart if a factor "is present to a degree
substantially in excess of that which ordinarily is involved in the offense." Id. at 95
(citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 5K2.0). Discouraged factors are those "not
ordinarily relevant to the determination of whether a sentence should be outside
the applicable guideline range." U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt.
H, introductory cmt. (1995) (acknowledging certain factors should not be factors
for departure); see, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 5H1.6 (noting family ties
and responsibilities are discouraged factors); id. § 5H1.2 (noting educational and
vocational skills are discouraged factors); id. § 5H1.11 (noting military and public
service record are discouraged factors). Discouraged factors, however, may be re-
lied upon in exceptional cases. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt.
H, introductory cmt. (1995) (stating discouraged factors should only be taken into
account when they are exceptional in degree or they in some way bring case
outside heartland). If the factor is a forbidden factor, the sentencing court cannot
use it as a basis for departure. See Koon, 518 U.S. at 95-96 (noting departure cannot
be granted for prohibited factors); see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES §§ 5H1.12,
5H1.4, 5K2.12 (prohibiting departure for lack of guidance as youth, drug or alco-
hol dependence or economic hardship, respectively).
33. Koon, 518 U.S. at 96 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1,
pt. A, at 6 (1995)).
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III. THE CONTROVERSIAL ENACTMENT OF THE FEENEY AMENDMENT
The Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Against the Exploitation of
Children Today Act ("PROTECT Act") 34 was considered and unanimously
passed in the Senate on February 24, 2003. 3 5 This legislation focused on
strengthening the prosecution of offenses against children. 36 The House
of Representatives considered the bill on March 26, 2003.37 Representa-
tive Thomas Feeney of Florida introduced a surprise amendment to this
legislation, which proposed to restrict downward departures in all cases to
those "specifically identified as a permissible ground of departure in the
sentencing guidelines."3 8 According to Representative Feeney, the
Amendment is essential to the fight against child pornography and abduc-
tion and necessary to stop judges from giving offenders a "slap on the
wrist" at sentencing.3
9
The matter then went to the Conference Committee, and, while it was
pending, virtually every segment of the criminal justice community voiced
concerns about various aspects of the so-called "Feeney Amendment."40
The Conference Committee reached a compromise and, as a result, nar-
rowed the breadth of the Amendment. 4 1 The Feeney Amendment, in its
34. Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003) (consisting of Feeney Amend-
ment and laws affecting crimes against children); United States v. VanLeer, 270 F.
Supp. 2d 1318, 1325-26 (D. Utah 2003) (discussing origin of PROTECT Act).
35. See 149 CONG. REc. S2573-90 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 2003) (noting legislation
passing in Senate).
36. For a further discussion of enacted legislation's effect on strengthening
child protection laws, see infra notes 136-55 and accompanying text.
37. See 149 CONG. REC. H2320-25 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 2003) (considering bill in
House).
38. VanLeer, 270 F. Supp. 2d at 1325-26 (citing 149 CONG. Ric. H2420-22
(daily ed. Mar. 27, 2003) and discussing Representative Feeney's rationale for
Amendment); see also Allenbaugh, supra note 4, at 8 (citing PROTECT Act).
39. See Allenbaugh, supra note 4, at 8 (stating purpose for Amendment). Rep-
resentative Feeney stated:
This amendment is an essential component of legislation to fight against
child pornography and abductions. Legislative efforts to fight against
child abduction and child pornography will be a fruitless gesture if at the
end of the day judges give offenders, particularly sex offenders, a slap on
the wrist. And a slap on the wrist is exactly what is happening today, with
increasing frequency.
Id. (citing Letter from Rep. F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. & Rep. Tom Feeney to
Colleagues, Support the Feeney Amendment to H.R. 1104 to Preserve Appropriate
and Justifiable Departures Under Sentencing Guidelines (Mar. 26, 2003)). Addi-
tionally, Representative Feeney stated that the "justification for [the] restriction
was to preventjudges from 'making up exceptions... as they go along.'" VanLeer,
270 F. Supp. 2d at 1321 (describing Feeney's motivation for Amendment); see also
149 CONG. REC. H2435 (2003) (statement by Rep. Feeney) (same).
40. See Letter from Sands, supra note 5 (urging Commission to preserve use of
downward departures).
41. See H.R. CONE. REP. No. 108-66, tit. IV (2003) (noting compromised
amendment); see also VanLeer, 270 F. Supp. 2d at 1322 (noting bipartisan agree-
ment reached). The proposed version of the Feeney Amendment would have
eliminated nine specified downward departures, including ones frequently relied
[Vol. 49: p. 693
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altered form, was agreed upon by both the House and Senate and was
included in the PROTECT Act, which was signed into law on April 30,
2003.42
Surprisingly, the Feeney Amendment, adopted under the guise of the
PROTECT Act, passed through the legislature with virtually no discussion
or debate and no public hearings on the Amendment's effects on sentenc-
ing law, policy and practice. 43 The introduction of the Amendment was
supported without any input solicited from the federal judiciary, the or-
upon. See Alan Vinegrad, The New Federal Sentencing Law, 15 FED. SENTENCING REP.
310, 310-13 (2003) (discussing changes from original to adopted version of Feeney
Amendment). The statute would have eliminated departures based on aberrant
behavior under section 5K2.20 of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. See id. (same). Ad-
ditionally and more controversially, the ability to depart if any mitigating factor not
taken into account by the Commission was found would have been abolished. See
id. (discussing proposed elimination of departure under section 5K2.0 of U.S. Sen-
tencing Guidelines). This residual departure method was explicitly approved in Koon
v. United States. See generally 518 U.S. 81 (1996) (holding departures constitutional
if factor based upon takes defendant outside heartland of cases). This would have
precluded judges from considering the defendant or the offense individually. The
ability to upwardly depart if an aggravating factor not considered was found, how-
ever, was not taken away. See 28 U.S.C. § 994 (2003) (containing no prohibition on
upwardly departing if aggravators found). For a further discussion of departure
limitations under the Feeney Amendment, see infra notes 47-135 and accompany-
ing text.
42. See generally PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003) (con-
taining Feeney Amendment). The compromise version has been called the
"Hatch-Sensenbrenner-Graham Compromise Amendment" but is most popularly
known as the Feeney Amendment. See 149 CONG. REc. S517-01 (daily ed. Apr. 10,
2003) (statement of Sen. Hatch); see also supra note 2 (observing terms "PROTECT
Act" and "Feeney Amendment" used interchangeably). The PROTECT Act is addi-
tionally famous for containing the federal version of "AMBER Alert," legislation
detailing the procedure for reporting on missing children over national broadcast
systems. See PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, §§ 301-05, 321-23, 341, 361, 363,
117 Stat. 650, 660-67 (2003) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5601, 5791,
5777, 5773, 5792, 13001, 13004 (2003) and 18 U.S.C. §§ 3056, 3796 (2003)) (in-
cluding "AMBER Alert" system legislation). One commentator noted that a "vote
against AMBER Alert would have been like a vote against motherhood and few
legislators were willing to have to defend such a vote to their constituents." Law-
rence S. Goldman, From the President: The Feeney Amendment, 27 CHAMPION 4 (2003)
(discussing passing of PROTECT Act). For a further discussion of the AMBER
Alert system, see infra notes 138-44 and accompanying text.
43. See H.R. 1104, 108th Cong. § 243 (2003) (noting vote of 357 to 58 passed
legislation); see also Allenbaugh, supra note 4, at 8 (noting "unprecedented scope
of the legislation, coupled with the fact that it was rammed through the legisla-
ture"); Letter from Bowman, supra note 3, at 1 (noting adoption of Feeney Amend-
ment by House with virtually no debate). One commentator expressed his
discontent, stating that "[t]he manner in which the Feeney Amendment was en-
acted revealed our legislative process at its very worst. These issues are too impor-
tant to our criminal justice system and the separation of powers to be decided in
such a hurried, thoughtless manner." Goldman, supra note 42, at 4 (discussing
Feeney Amendment from perspective of Lawrence S. Goldman, President of
NACDL).
9
Stappert: A Death Sentence for Justice: The Feeney Amendment Frustrates Fed
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2004
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
ganized bar, legal academics, criminal justice experts or even the
Commission.4 4
Attorney General John Ashcroft stated that the Feeney Amendment
was designed to ensure that the Guidelines "would be more faithfully and
consistently enforced" and "to ensure that the incidence of downward de-
partures [is] substantially reduced. '45 In reality, the Feeney Amendment
is designed to increase the actual penalties imposed against federally con-
victed individuals by strictly limiting, barring and, ultimately, intimidating
federal judges from considering different factors that allow for leniency in
sentencing in individual cases.4
6
IV. DEVASTATION TO JUDGES
The Feeney Amendment displays significant disrespect for the his-
toric role that judges have had in the sentencing process. 47 The responsi-
bility of imposing sentences on defendants is a "sensitive task" that is
entrusted only to those qualified.48 Nevertheless, this legislation threatens
judicial discretion and authority by considerably curtailing the use of the
downward departure and by placing judges under heightened scrutiny.4 9
While eliminating disparity in sentencing is an important goal of the
Guidelines, the main goal should be individualized justice. 50 In Koon, the
Supreme Court stated that "[i]t has been uniform and constant in the
federal judicial tradition for the sentencing judge to consider every con-
victed person as an individual and every case as a unique study in the
human failings that sometimes mitigate, sometimes magnify, the crime
and the punishment to ensue."5 1 Federal defendants are often individuals
44. See Vinegrad, supra note 41, at 314-15 (expressing dissatisfaction with legis-
lative process when Feeney Amendment was passed).
45. Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Attorney General, to All Federal Pros-
ecutors, Department Policies and Procedure Concerning Sentencing Recommen-
dations and Sentencing Appeals (July 28, 2003) [hereinafter Memorandum from
Ashcroft] (citations omitted) (providing purpose of Feeney Amendment).
46. See Prison Talk, Feeney Amendment-Sentencing Practices Part 2, at http://
www.prisontalk.com/forums/showthread.php?t=12464&highlight-Feeney (last vis-
ited Jan. 26, 2004) (summarizing impact of Feeney Amendment and analyzing its
different sections); see also Martin, supra note 12, at A31 ("These amendments are
an effort to intimidate judges to follow sentencing guidelines.").
47. See Vinegrad, supra note 41, at 315 (contending legislation shows ex-
traordinary disrespect for federal judges).
48. See id. (noting federal judges must be nominated by President and con-
firmed by Senate to serve).
49. See id. (suggesting legislation is direct attack on judges).
50. See Zachary L. Berman, Judge Martin Leaves Bench Critical of Sentencing Rules,
N.Y.LJ., Aug. 15, 2003, at 2 (noting goal of Guidelines). Judge Martin stated, "I
could end all disparity by simply hanging everyone who commits a crime," but
explained individual justice should be the main goal of sentencing. Id. (quoting
U.S. Southern District of New York Judge John S. Martin who implies that easy
solution is not correct one).
51. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 113 (1996) (noting tradition of indi-
vidualized sentencing); see also Berman, supra note 50, at 2 (quoting same).
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who were not only initially dealt a bad hand in life, but had limited oppor-
tunities offered to them throughout. 52 Typically, judges recognize this
and do allow compassion to influence their sentences when appropriate.
53
The use of departures has been the mechanism of compassion that judges
utilize to attain individualized sentences.
5 4
The use of downward departures does not equate to an overwhelming
amount of mitigation in sentencing, as the enactment of the Feeney
Amendment implies. 55 Departures also do not indicate judges' recalci-
trance by being "soft on crime."'56 Judges generally sentence in accor-
dance with the law and according to the applicable Guidelines. 57 Judges
who depart are not giving criminals a "break," but are ensuring that their
sentences are just.58 Ajudge should only depart when the sentence range
52. See Berman, supra note 50, at 2-3 (recognizing judges become aware of
defendant's unfortunate circumstances). One commentator described the process
one judge endures during sentencing:
When [Judge Martin] examines the backgrounds of many defendants
who come before him for drug-related crimes, Judge Martin said he gen-
erally finds "people who leave school in the ninth grade and come from
single parent homes, sometimes with addicted parents." These people
have few opportunities, Judge Martin said, "the choice is to go be a dish-
washer in a restaurant or sell drugs. When you are talking about retribu-
tion for these people, it is hard to get on a moral high horse."
Id. (providing one judge's reflection on defendants' individual situations).
53. See id. (demonstrating how Judge Martin allows his compassion to influ-
ence his sentencing).
54. See id. at 3 (utilizing departures to show compassion in sentencing).
55. See id. (providing examples of "tougher" sentencing practices).
56. Controversial Memo, supra note 31 (pointing out misconception that depar-
tures mean judges are being too lenient).
57. See Vinegrad, supra note 41, at 315 ("Statistics show that [federal judges]
have, by and large, discharged this responsibility consistent with the letter and
spirit of the Guidelines."). The thrust of the debate has been about what happens
with the majority of departures. There are occasions, however, where some depar-
tures may be considered foolish or at least highly suspect. See, e.g., United States v.
Roach, 296 F.3d 565 (7th Cir. 2002) (providing example of appellate court revers-
ing district court's questionable departure). In Roach, the district court granted a
downward departure at sentencing, finding the defendant suffered from a serious
mental condition that made it nearly impossible to control her "shopping binges."
See id. at 566-68 (discussing facts and district court ruling). The appellate court
noted that in order to depart on mental defect, the defendant must suffer from a
"significantly reduced mental capacity." See id. at 568 (relying on section 5K2.12 of
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines). The court held that evidence of compulsive shopping
behavior is insufficient, without more, to support a departure and remanded the
case for resentencing. See id. at 569-73 (analyzing claim).
58. See Controversial Memo, supra note 31 (describing one districtjudge's down-
ward departure in VanLeer as not being "soft" but as being just). United States v.
VanLeer provides a good example of when a downward departure is warranted in
order to make a sentence just. Paul Bradley VanLeer, the defendant, was found
guilty of being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 9 2 2 (g) (1). See
United States v. VanLeer, 270 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1319-20 (D. Utah 2003) (stating
facts). VanLeer had a friend store his shotgun while he was in prison and when
VanLeer had finished serving his sentence, he picked up the gun and took it to a
local pawnshop because he needed rent money. See id. at 1319 (same). Techni-
2004]
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proposed by the Guidelines is, according to the judge, more severe than
what the offender deserves.
59
Despite the availability of downward departures, many judges have
not shied away from meting out tough sentences. 60 Since Congress first
enacted the Guidelines, the federal prison population has increased al-
most five hundred percent to a total of over two million. 61 This is hardly
evidence of a lenient judiciary.62 Statistics indicate that on average, down-
ward departures were granted only in about twelve percent of federal
cases. 63 Proponents of the Amendment focused on the substantial in-
crease in non-cooperation departures since Koon was decided in 1996.64
The increase, however, was attributable to "fast track" departures granted
in border districts with high immigration caseloads, accounting for seventy
percent of departures cases.65 In addition, government motions for down-
ward departures for cooperating defendants account for approximately
cally, VanLeer committed the federal crime of a "felon in possession of a firearm."
See id. at 1319 (acknowledging actions of defendant constituted crime). The court
found that a downward departure under section 5K2.11 of the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines was warranted because this case did not involve the harms envisioned by
Congress when it enacted felon-in-possession laws and was outside the heartland of
cases supported by the Guideline range. See id. at 1326-27 (deciding case fell
outside heartland and departure was necessary). While the Guidelines called for
thirty to thirty-seven months, the court sentenced VanLeer to eighteen months.
See id. at 1320, 1327 (imposing sentence).
59. See Allenbaugh, supra note 4, at 10 (noting "downward departures are not
granted out of mercy" but only where warranted).
60. See Berman, supra note 50, at 1 (providing examples of when one judge
upwardly departed and gave harsher sentences). Many severe sentences, however,
are often the result of mandatory minimums over which judges have no control.
See Talk Left, Justice Breyer Raps Mandatory Minimums (Sept. 22, 2003), at http://
www.talkleft.com/archives/004359.html (discussing Justice Breyer's denounce-
ment of mandatory minimum sentences).
61. See Cokie Roberts & Steven Roberts, Sentencing Modification Gains Some Un-
likely Allies, NASHVILLE CITY PAPER, Aug. 29, 2003, at http://www.nashvillecitypaper.
com/index.cfm?section=40&screen=news&newsid=26106 (acknowledging rise in
prison sentences since Guidelines enacted).
62. See id. (stating "[t]he 'lock 'em up and throw away the key' crowd is riding
high in Washington"). Consider the words ofJustice Kennedy, encouraging a per-
ception of inmates as more than criminals and advocating that "the more than 2
million inmates in the United States are human beings whose minds and spirits we
must try to reach." Id. (quoting Justice Kennedy).
63. See Vinegrad, supra note 41, at 314 (providing that, since Koon, departure
rates average 12.2% of cases); see alsoJonathon Groner, Panel Caught in Tussle over
Judges' Power; Lauyers: Sentencing Commission Should Resist Effort to Curb Bench, LEGAL
TIMES, Aug. 18, 2003, at 1 (reporting downward departures in 7.5% to 12.2% of all
federal cases).
64. SeeVinegrad, supra note 41, at 314 (providing non-cooperation departure
rates increased from 4,201 in 1996 to 10,026 in 2001).
65. See id. (discussing "fast track" departures). Fast track departures were im-
plemented to alleviate burdens placed on prosecutors and district courts. See id.
(revealing necessity for departure). Congress has even directed the Commission
to create a guideline for this practice. See id. (directing implementation of guide-
line in response).
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eighteen percent.6 6 There has even been a recommendation in recent
years that judges should depart in more cases.6 7
The Feeney Amendment interferes with a judge's discretionary au-
thority by limiting the availability of downward departures. The legislation
eliminates the use of specific downward departure grounds when sentenc-
ing sexual abuse, child-victim and obscenity offenses. 68 No longer can a
judge consider departures in these cases based on, inter alia, aberrant be-
havior, family ties, community ties or military, civic or public service when
sentencing a convicted defendant.6 9 Although the actual legislation is
much narrower in scope than the proposed version, which tried to eradi-
cate virtually all downward departures, it still considerably limits ajudge's
discretion. 70 A person found guilty of these specified offenses must now
be treated as a category instead of an individual under the law.
Concomitantly, although the Feeney Amendment only explicitly takes
away ajudge's ability to depart in a minority of cases, the legislation might
implicitly cause judges to rethink and possibly refrain from departing.
The Amendment requires prosecutors to report to the Department ofJus-
tice (DOJ) when a judge departs against the DOJ's objection. 71 This new
66. See id. (noting government-supported departures make up majority of
departures).
67. See Letter from Sands, supra note 5 (noting personal experience that
judges grant too few departures where they are warranted).
68. See 18 U.S.C. § 3552 (2003) (removing ability to depart); 28 U.S.C. § 994
(2003) (same); see also Vinegrad, supra note 41, at 313 (noting changes to original
Feeney version eliminated these departure grounds entirely while enacted version
eliminated them only in regard to certain crimes).
69. See 18 U.S.C. § 3552 (removing ability to depart and certain considera-
tions in sentencing offenders); 28 U.S.C. § 994 (same). These grounds for down-
ward departures are still available in cases not involving sexual abuse, a child-victim
or obscenity. See Vinegrad, supra note 41, at 313 (discussing changes to originally
proposed amendment).
70. See Vinegrad, supra note 41, at 314-16 (discussing negative impact of Fee-
ney Amendment). One senator noted, however, that the type of cases affected by
this limitation represent only two percent of the federal caseload. See 149 CONG.
REc. S5113 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 2003) (statement of Sen. Sessions) (emphasizing
constraint of Feeney Amendment).
71. See Memorandum from Ashcroft, supra note 45 (instructing prosecutors to
report when judges depart). The Feeney Amendment requires the attorney gen-
eral to submit a report to the House and Senate Judiciary Committees within fif-
teen days whenever a district judge departs downward in a case for reasons other
than substantial assistance to the government. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2003) (report-
ing departures by judges to DOJ). The effective date for this amendment was sus-
pended for ninety days. See id. (detailing requirements for indefinite suspension).
It will be suspended indefinitely if the attorney general takes steps to ensure vigor-
ous pursuit of appealing unjustified downward departures. See id. (same).
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reporting requirement will intimidate judges into not departing for fear of
being reversed. 7 2 This reporting system will effectively blacklist judges.73
Likewise, this reporting system devastates the fundamental separation
of powers among the branches.74 Judges' records are already open and
available to the public and can be used to get statistical evidence about
sentencing. 7 5 Reporting to the executive agency on individual judges for
conducting a specific aspect of their routine business is surely interference
with the ideal structure of the federal system. 76
The Feeney Amendment further requires de novo appellate review of
departure decisions, thereby overruling the Supreme Court's decision in
72. See Blacklisting Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2003, § 4, at 10 [hereinafter
Blacklisting Judges] (discussing effect of reporting system). This "blacklisting" in-
centivizes judges to refrain from departing (out of fear of being reversed). See id.
(noting reporting system is attempt "to make federal judges yield to political pres-
sures from Washington"); see also Steve Karnowski, Courts:Judge Criticizes Federal Sen-
tencing Policies, PIONEER PRESS, Oct. 22, 2003, available at http://www.twincities.
com/mld/pioneerpress/2003/10/news/nation/7070526.htm?templa (providing
example of intimidated judge). U.S. District Judge Paul Magnuson admitted to
feeling intimidated when explaining his decision not to grant a downward depar-
ture. See id. (blaming Congress and DOJ for feeling intimidated). When asked to
respond to Judge Magnuson's concerns, Judge Donovan Frank replied:
Do I share Judge Magnuson's concerns about where all this is going to
go, where it relates to the independence of the judiciary? Yes .. . , [b]ut
have I changed how I do my sentencing? No, I have not. I don't feel
intimidated and I'm not any less likely to depart up or down than I was.
Id. (offering contrary opinion that he felt no intimidation).
73. See Blacklisting Judges, supra note 72, at 10 (discussing blacklist effect of
providing names of judges who depart to DOJ); see also 149 CONG. Rc. S5137
(daily ed. Apr. 10, 2003) (statement of Sen. Leahy) ("The [final] language retains
the Feeney amendment's attempt to intimidate Federal judges by compiling a 'hit
list' of all judges who impose sentences that the Justice Department does not
like .... It takes a sledge hammer to the concept of separation of powers."); Emily
Bazelon, With No Sentencing Leeway, What's Left to Judge?, WASH. POST, May 4, 2003,
at B04 ("In other words, the prosecutors are saying: We're watching you.").
74. See Albert J. Krieger, A Wave and a Wish, 18 CrIM. JusT. 1, 29 (2003) (dis-
cussing separation of powers implications of Feeney Amendment's reporting sys-
tem). The likely response to this argument by proponents of the Amendment
could possibly be that federal prosecutors work for the DOJ, and therefore, this is
just a coordinated, information-gathering approach. For a further discussion of
separation of powers issues in sentencing, see infra notes 102-08 and accompany-
ing text.
75. See Krieger, supra note 74, at 29 (noting court records are public).
76. See id. (discussing separation of powers issues of Feeney Amendment).
One criminal defense attorney eloquently stated:
Requiring the names of the judges who downwardly depart to be re-
ported to Congress brings sickening recollections of the list of names
waved by Senator Joe McCarthy. It is almost too obvious to mention that
the legislature funds the other two branches of government. It is axio-
matic that the purse strings can be the hangman's noose.
Id. (emphasizing discontent with reporting requirement of Feeney Amendment);
see also Vinegrad, supra note 41, at 315 (recommending that bar and academics
focus attention on Feeney Amendment's separation of powers issues).
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Koon.77 This standard of review offers less deference to the sentencing
judge than the formerly applied "abuse of discretion" standard afforded. 78
De novo review makes it much easier for a district judge to be reversed on
appeal because all it takes is a simple disagreement by the appellate
court.79 This change in standard, coupled with the reporting require-
ments, can only intrude on ajudge's realm of discretion to which the deci-
sion to depart has been traditionally reserved.80
77. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (2003) (" [T] he court of appeals shall review de
novo the district court's application of the guidelines to the facts."), with Koon v.
United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996) (finding abuse of discretion appropriate stan-
dard of review for departure appeals); see also Allenbaugh, supra note 4, at 8 (stat-
ing Feeney Amendment overrules Koon). For a further discussion of the facts and
holding of Koon, see supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
78. Compare BLACK's LAw Dic-rioNARY 94 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "appeal de
novo" as "[a]n appeal in which the appellate court uses the trial court's record but
reviews the evidence and law without deference to the trial court's rulings"), with
id. at 10 (defining "abuse of discretion" as "[a]n appellate court's standard for
reviewing a decision that is asserted to be grossly unsound, unreasonable, or
illegal").
When questioned on the Feeney Amendment's change in standard of review,
Assistant Federal Public Defender Anne Blanchard commented:
It would be all too easy to misconstrue this change as a minor modification to
a rather technical legal standard. In practice, it is anything but minor or technical.
The nuances that are gleaned at sentencing hearings often tip the scales ever so
slightly in favor of or against a downward departure. Districtjudges are not merely
listening for the bare facts. They are making the myriad of personal observations
which inform their ultimate view of an issue. For example, they see and hear the
actual effect on the family member who will be without their sole means of sup-
port. They hear first hand the insight the doctor provides as to why the dimin-
ished mental capacity contributed so mightily to a defendant's involvement with
the crime. They evaluate the witnesses one by one as they come before the court to
tell of the defendant's extraordinary efforts and success at rehabilitation and resti-
tution to the victims. The merits of proposed departures often turn on such in-
tangibles as demeanor, credibility, genuine remorse or whether a certain
defendant or circumstance is truly extraordinary. The nuances that are available
to a district court in deciding these matters are simply unavailable to a court re-
viewing a cold record. While we would never permit a system whereby guilt was
determined by ajury who was only given a transcript of a trial, this is precisely what
the Protect Act mandates with respect to appeals of equally delicate sentencing
matters. A further result of this change in the standard of review is that the gov-
ernment gets a second bite of the apple. They can relitigate all departure motions
with the appellate court with the advantage that none of the nuances the district
court relied upon and perhaps very little of the real world justice the district court
was trying to achieve will be brought to bear on the ultimate sentence the individ-
ual will receive. Such a state of affairs is both unwise and unjust.
E-mail from Anne Blanchard, Assistant Federal Public Defender, District of New
Jersey, to Patrice Stappert (Apr. 2, 2004, 05:52:43 EST) (on file with author).
79. See Vinegrad, supra note 41, at 315 (noting appellate courts may reverse
district courts "simply because they disagree with them").
80. See Berman, supra note 50, at 12 (discussing pressure on judges). After
being asked what advice a retiring judge had for new judges, the judge responded
that new judges should not be afraid to take risks or worry about being reversed
because departing from the Guidelines is "precisely [the issue] that district judges
should most be willing to risk reversal." Id. (urging newjudges to ignore possibility
of reversal).
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The Feeney Amendment also heightens the writing requirements for
district judges by demanding a judge state with specificity every possible
alternative ground for departure or risk forfeiting that departure ground
on remand. 8 1 The PROTECT Act requires districtjudges in virtually every
instance to state their reasons for departures "with specificity in the writ-
ten order of judgment and commitment."82 Although this heightened
writing standard furthers the goal of a reasoned and structured sentencing
system, the district judge loses the ability to make departures on remand if
these departure grounds were not specifically included in the judge's orig-
inal sentence.8 3
In addition, the composition of the Commission was altered to limit
judicial representation. Before the Feeney Amendment, the Commission
consisted of seven voting members, of which at least three had to be fed-
eraljudges. 84 Under the Feeney Amendment, no more than three federal
judges may serve on the Commission at one time.85 By providing a maxi-
mum instead of a minimum number ofjudges, the Commission conceiva-
bly could lack judicial representation once the current judges' terms
expire.8 6 This alteration is both illogical and inexplicable as it is the
judges on the Commission who bring invaluable first-hand knowledge of
sentencing.
V. THE FEENEY AMENDMENT FRUSTRATES THE SYSTEM
The Feeney Amendment makes a variety of changes related to federal
sentencing procedures. 87 While it may appease Congress, it frustrates
each major player in the game of sentencing to an unparalleled degree.
Defense counsel, prosecutors and the U.S. Sentencing Commission have
all been adversely affected by this legislation.8 8
81. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2003) (demanding reasons for departure must "be
stated with specificity in the written order ofjudgment and commitment"); see also
id. § 3742 (limiting review to written reasons).
82. Id. § 3553 (requiring specificity).
83. See id. § 3742 (limiting departures on remand). For a further discussion
on the limitation to depart on remand, see infra notes 89-97 and accompanying
text.
84. See 28 U.S.C. § 991 (a) (2003) (establishing composition of Commission).
85. See id. (striking "[a]t least three" and inserting "[n]ot more than 3" in
statute); see also Vinegrad, supra note 41, at 314 (noting Feeney Amendment lim-
ited judicial representation on Commission).
86. See Vinegrad, supra note 41, at 314 (noting possible implications of maxi-
mum judge requirement). One commentator noted this change is a "discrete but
unmistakable slap at the federal judiciary." Id. (acknowledging deliberate effect of
change). Currently, there are four federal judges on the Commission. See Groner,
supra note 63, at 1 (providing current status of judges on Commission).
87. See Memorandum from Ashcroft, supra note 45 (describing Feeney
Amendment as "landmark piece of legislation").
88. For a further discussion of the Feeney Amendment's adverse effects, see
infra notes 89-135 and accompanying text.
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A. Defense
The Feeney Amendment detrimentally impacts defense counsel and
their clients. The Amendment forces defense counsel to raise every con-
ceivable basis for departure or risk permanent waiver in any future re-
mand.8 9 Essentially, the Amendment disrupts the defense's strategy and
compels the defense to argue the departure issue far more thoroughly
than it otherwise would have had to absent the Amendment's waiver
consequences. 90
Before the PROTECT Act, "[mlost seasoned defense attorneys ...
would follow the wise adage 'quit while you're ahead,' and sit down with-
out pressing for specific rulings on the alternative departure grounds."
91
This was because the arguments would be preserved on remand because,
while defense counsel raised the alternative departure grounds, they de-
clined to specifically press the judge to rule upon them.92 Now, defense
counsel is effectively forced to seek and obtain written rulings on every
possible basis or alternative basis for a downward departure, lest these po-
89. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(g) (2003) (restricting district court's ability to depart
downward on remand); see also id. § 3553(c) (requiring district court to state rea-
sons for departure with specificity); Lisa A. Cahill & Kevin F. Clines, Waiver Dangers
Under the PROTECT Act, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 25, 2003, at 4 (discussing Feeney Amend-
ment's effect on defense attorneys).
90. See Cahill & Clines, supra note 89, at 4-6 (discussing impact on defense
attorneys).
91. Id. (describing defense attorneys' tactical approach). To illustrate the ef-
fects of the Amendment the authors provide the following hypothetical:
In the pre-sentence submission, defense counsel argues for a downward
departure based on the client's cooperation, his voluntary disclosure of
the offense, and the aberrant nature of the offense, all recognized depar-
ture bases under the guidelines (U.S.S.G. §§ 5Kl.1, 5K2.16, 5K2.20). The
government opposes all departures. The district court begins the sen-
tencing proceeding by announcing that the defendant's cooperation
does warrant a departure, and that the defendant will be sentenced to
time served based on that departure ground alone. The court avoids as
moot any ruling on the "aberrant nature" or "voluntary disclosure"
grounds for departure.... [U]nder the new act, if the government suc-
cessfully appealed the one departure ground ruled upon by the district
court.., on remand the sentencing court would be barred from consid-
ering alternative departure grounds not specifically included in the origi-
nal sentence.
Id. (providing illustration of effects of Amendment).
92. See id. (noting procedure before PROTECT Act). Typically, parties are
restricted from raising any new arguments on remand that they did not make in
connection with their original sentencing. See United States v. Quintieri, 306 F.3d
1217, 1227 (2d Cir. 2002), cert. denied sub nom., Donato v. United States, 123 S. Ct.
2246 (2003) (discussing "mandate rule"). An argument, however, is "not consid-
ered waived on resentencing if the party did not, at the time of the purported
waiver, 'have both an opportunity and an incentive to raise it before the sentenc-
ing court or on appeal.'" Cahill & Clines, supra note 89, at 6 (citing Quintieri, 306
F.3d at 1229).
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tential departures be waived on remand. 3 Defense counsel must press
the court and insist that it rule on every alternative basis for departure and
include those accepted grounds in the written ruling.94
The rule also imposes significant extra costs and pressures on the de-
fense. Additional time researching and drafting possible departure
grounds amount to greater financial costs to the defendant and greater
temporal costs to the attorney. 95 Sentencing hearings that might have
taken a short time will be dragged out so debates can occur over departure
grounds that might never affect the sentencing.9 6 Furthermore, the rule
has the potential to flood appellate courts with ineffective assistance of
counsel claims.
9 7
An amendment that purports to treat each defendant and each case
alike inevitably will frustrate defense counsel. The defense's role is hard
enough with the uneven playing field of the current judicial system. 98
Typically, defense counsel gets the case long after the prosecution con-
ducts a full investigation, gathered and examined evidence and inter-
viewed witnesses.99 The resources available to defense counsel are
93. See Cahill & Clines, supra note 89, at 4 (discussing practicalities of
amendments).
94. See id. at 6 ("[D]efense counsel must now find a way to insist politely but
firmly that the initial sentencing court rule on every alternative basis for departure
and that it include those accepted bases in the written statement of reasons for the
departure in the judgment and commitment order.").
95. See id. (noting hardships placed on defense counsel).
96. See id. (considering significantly longer sentencing proceedings). This
lengthened time commitment will burden the courts by creating backups for .each
judge and prosecutor. See id. (same).
97. See id. ("[I]t is an 'ineffective assistance' minefield for the unwitting lawyer
who thought it was always not only safe but smart practice to quit while ahead.").
98. See generally H. RICHARD UVILLER, THE TILTED PLAYING FIELD (1999) (ana-
lyzing fairness of criminal justice system). The author acknowledges that in the
existing system, the adversaries in a criminal case will not be evenly endowed. See
id. at 279 (discussing inequalities in current system depending on defendant's
guilt). The author poses to the reader:
[H]ave we at least settled on a working definition of what we mean by
fair? At least, are we agreed that we do not mean what sports fans would
consider fair-that is, an evenly matched contest? Playing on a level play-
ing field? I suppose one might say that, absent gross oppression, what is
fair in the criminal justice system-as in life in general-is what is famil-
iar . . . . I must say it seems to me that the American system for the
delivery of criminal justice, while tilted in many respects, is not out of
balance in that, in the main, it embodies a fair distribution of licenses
and limits to the parties, an allocation that closely corresponds to their
differing functions in the process. It is, in other words, tolerably fair.
Id. at 305-07 (concluding system is workable).
99. See generally id. at 73-112 (considering resources available in adversarial
system); see also MARC L. MILLER & RONALD F. WRIGHT, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES:
CASES, STATUTES, AND EXECUTIVE MATERIALS 675 (2d ed. 2003) ("During the earli-
est phases of the criminal process, defense lawyers are rarely to be seen."). While
the defense usually does not have the opportunity to begin its case until much later
in the process, a considerable amount of value should be given to the method's
[Vol. 49: p. 693
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generally minimal compared to those available to the prosecution.1 00
Often the defense counsel's only line of defense is to argue that the defen-
dant's individual circumstance warrants a departure from the severity of
the applicable Guideline range.
B. Prosecution
The Feeney Amendment significantly affects federal prosecutors.
While the sentencing system already gives the prosecution considerable
discretion, the Feeney Amendment purports to increase its power even
more. 10 1 The rationale for this increase of prosecutorial power in the sen-
tencing process is unfounded and inappropriate.
Traditionally, the federal prosecutor's discretion to determine what
charges to bring was counterbalanced in sentencing by judges who deter-
mined the actual sentence to be imposed. 10 2 Trends over the last twenty
years have greatly eroded the separation between charging and sentenc-
ing, basically shifting both to the prosecution.10 3 Prosecutors decide "who
to charge, what to charge, what plea to accept and, increasingly, what the
sentence, or at least sentencing range, is."1 0 4 Despite their already deeply
rooted and overwhelming discretion, prosecutors in U.S. Attorneys' Of-
attempt to ensure the government is only indicting people after full investigations.
See generally id. at 797-836 (supporting necessity for complete investigation).
100. See MILLER & WRIGHT, supra note 99, at 797-836 (comparing system re-
sources as whole and pertaining to financial resources of individual defendants).
101. For a discussion of the increase in prosecutorial discretion granted by
the PROTECT Act, see infra notes 102-21 and accompanying text.
102. See Ian Weinstein, Perspectives on Federal Sentencing Guidelines and
Mandatory Sentencing: Fifteen Years After the Federal Sentencing Revolution: How
Mandatory Minimums Have Undermined Effective and Just Narcotics Sentencing, 40 AM.
CRiM. L. REv. 87, 103 (2003) (tracing history of prosecutorial discretion).
103. See id. (noting trend to combine power over charging and sentencing).
Three trends occurred which shifted the power both to charge and sentence to the
prosecutor, particularly in federal narcotics cases. See id. (discussing trends). It
has been described that:
The first trend is accelerating overcriminalization. Federal authorities
now have jurisdiction over a greater range of conduct and can bring
charges from an ever-expanding menu of more specific and serious
charges. The second trend is the emergence of mandatory minimum
sneering statutes that have turned the power to charge into power to dic-
tate the sentence. Charging and sentencing are much more tightly
bound than they were under old law. A third trend, increasingly harsh
sentences, has made the increase in discretion more significant because
prosecutors not only have more control over cases, but they also wield a
bigger stick when they exercise that authority.
Id. (detailing trends).
104. Goldman, supra note 42, at 4 (expressing disgust with prosecutorial de-
sire for more power over sentencing). The author points out that "[flour out of
five downward departures from the Sentencing Guidelines are requested by prose-
cutors. But the one out of five that a judge imposes without their agreement
bothers them. They want to eliminate or greatly curtail these departures." Id.
(commenting on prosecution's motivation).
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fices and the DOJ lobbied and pressed the Feeney Amendment through
Congress to gain more.
1 0 5
Under the new legislation, the attorney general is directed to take
certain steps toward aggressively appealing improper downward depar-
tures. 10 6 Accordingly, Attorney General Ashcroft issued a memorandum
that outlined the DOJ's policies on downward departures and the appeals
process to all federal prosecutors. 10 7 Ashcroft instructed federal prosecu-
tors to "acquiesce" to departures only in rare occurrences and appeal in
far more cases.1
0 8
Studies show, however, that a prosecutor almost never appeals when a
judge gives a defendant a lesser sentence than the Guidelines recom-
mend.1 0 9 The low appeal rate suggests that most prosecutors do not disa-
gree when a judge gives a particular defendant leniency. 110 When these
limited appeals are made, the circuit courts reverse the departures granted
by the district courts in the majority of cases, signifying that courts are not
reluctant to reverse arguable departure decisions. 11'
105. See Bazelon, supra note 73, at B04 (noting Feeney Amendment was
driven by prosecutors).
106. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2003) (encouraging efforts to appeal departure
decisions).
107. See Controversial Memo, supra note 31 (discussing Ashcroft Memoran-
dum); see also Memorandum from Ashcroft, supra note 45 (detailing appropriate
action under PROTECT Act by prosecutors).
108. See Memorandum from Ashcroft, supra note 45 ("Government acquies-
cence in a downward departure should be, as the Guidelines Manual itself sug-
gests, a 'rare occurenc[e]'. . . . Department attorneys also have an affirmative
obligation to oppose any sentencing adjustments, including downward departures,
that are not supported by the facts and the law."); see also Controversial Memo, supra
note 31 (instructing prosecutors to resist departures); Groner, supra note 63, at 1
(discussing Ashcroft's instruction to appeal in far more cases).
109. See Bazelon, supra note 73, at B04 (discussing appeal statistics).
110. See id. (finding "most prosecutors agree, or at least are not outraged,
when a judge thinks a defendant deserves leniency"). Federal prosecutors ap-
pealed in only 282 cases from 1991 to 2002, which is less than 0.1% of the time. See
id. (providing statistics); see also Letter from Bowman, supra note 3, at 3 (explaining
low appeal rate by prosecutors).
111. See Letter from Bowman, supra note 3, at 1 (stating that even under Koon
standard of review courts were "not shy about reversing legally questionable depar-
tures"); see also U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2001 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENC-
ING STATisTics tbl. 58 (2002) (providing that in fiscal year 2001, circuit courts
reversed departures in more than seventy-five percent of rare cases in which gov-
ernment appealed); Bazelon, supra note 73, at B04 (finding "[t]he prosecutors
who fought to curtail judges' discretion did so to increase their own"). Studies
'show that "[i]n 2001, judges nationally 'departed downward' from the Guidelines
in only 18 percent of cases or in about 10,000 of 55,000 cases." Id. (providing
statistics). Further inquiry revealed that "[a ] bout 6,000 of [these] departures were
in five districts along the Mexican border, where courts often reduce sentences to
'fast track' immigration violations with the assent of the U.S. Attorneys' offices
there." Id. (explaining in majority of cases departures are encouraged by
prosecutors).
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Additionally, the new legislation, consistent with the instructions
given by Ashcroft, requires prosecutors to report to the DOJ when a judge
grants a departure over a prosecutor's objection. 112 As a result, the deci-
sion to appeal, which is normally reserved to the prosecutor, is shifted to
the DOJ. 113 When most departures come at the behest of the prosecu-
tion, it seems injudicious to place this undeserved pressure on judges. 11 4
Further, Ashcroft's memorandum strengthens the DOJ's dominion
over the practice of plea-bargaining and ultimately discourages its use.1 15
While prosecutors request departures based on several factors, the typical
request is for the substantial assistance the defendant provides during the
course of the investigation.1 6 This cooperation provides prosecutors with
112. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2003) (requiring prompt notification by attorneys
to DOJ in Washington); see also Memorandum from Ashcroft, supra note 45 (in-
structing prosecutors to report when judges depart); Controversial Memo, supra note
31 (same). The Ashcroft Memorandum requires the prosecutor to file the report
within fourteen days after the judge imposed the adverse departure. See id. (pro-
viding time limit for reporting).
113. See Blacklisting Judges, supra note 72, at 10 (discussing shift in decision-
making power). One analyst stated:
Under the new law, federal prosecutors will be required in many cases to
report when ajudge departs downward from the sentence recommended
by the federal guidelines .... At the very least, the Ashcroft plan would
subject federal prosecutors to an unusual, and undesirable, degree of top-
down management. Right now, individual prosecutors decide when to
appeal ajudge's sentence. Mr. Ashcroft seems to want that decision to be
a review from Washington. A prosecutor who feels a given judge is con-
sistently handing out sentences that are too mild can certainly let his or
her feelings be known to superiors. This new, rigorous and rigid report-
ing system seems to treat prosecutors as lackeys, and also as some kind of
minor civil servants who can be ordered around by the president and his
appointees.
Id. (expressing criticisms of reporting system).
114. See Letter from Bowman, supra note 3, at 3 ("When downward departures
are provided, they are almost always made at the behest of prosecutors-belying any
suggestion that departures represent some sort of systematic judicial bias against
the government or the guidelines' goals of fairer or more consistent sentencing.").
In fiscal year 2001, seventy-nine percent of downward departures were requested
by the government. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2001 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL
SENTENCING STATISTICS app. B (2002) (providing data on frequency of departures
requested by government). In addition, this reporting requirement creates ajudi-
cial "black list" which may intimidate judges and keep them from departing. See
Blacklisting Judges, supra note 72, at 10 (discussing possible effect on judges).
115. See Bowman, supra note 19, at A27 (discussing memorandum's effects);
see also Memorandum from Ashcroft, supra note 45 (detailing proper negotia-
tions). The prosecutor cannot "fact bargain" or be a party to any agreement that
provides the sentencing court with less than a "full understanding of all readily
provable facts relevant to sentencing." Id. at 3 (limiting plea agreements). Plea
agreements must not be entered into where the government's ight to object is
waived. See id. (same). Further, prosecutors must not recommend departures un-
less fully consistent with all sentencing acts. See id. (same).
116. See Behre & Ifrah, supra note 16, at 8 (discussing powers of prosecutors
in sentencing).
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important leverage in plea negotiations. 117 Potentially, the Feeney
Amendment could considerably alter a prosecutor's ability to make plea
agreements with defendants, as departures might be granted less often,
thus forcing prosecutors to lose their bargaining tool.'
1 8
Finally, the legislation requires a formal motion for the defendant to
receive an additional one-level reduction for acceptance of responsibil-
ity.' 19 This reduction was previously granted without motion from the
government. 120 These changes by the Feeney Amendment certainly bol-
ster the role of the prosecutor in federal sentencing. 121
C. Sentencing Commission
The Feeney Amendment is the most significant attempt to relegate
the role of the Sentencing Commission since the Commission's crea-
tion. 12 2 Despite the Commission's role as the very body charged with the
responsibility of creating and amending the Guidelines, it was virtually ig-
117. See id. (same).
118. See Bowman, supra note 19, at A27 (discussing potential departures as
leverage).
119. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(a) (2003) (requiring motion from government); U.S.
Sentencing Comm'n, Sentencing Commission Sends Amendments to Congress, GUIDE-
LINES 1 (July 2003) [hereinafter Commission Sends Amendments to Congress] (listing
PROTECT Act amendments).
120. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 5K2.0 (2002) (providing means to de-
part based on acceptance of responsibility); see also id. § 3E.1 (limiting departure
for particularly defined acceptance of responsibility).
121. Much criticism has been voiced about this increase in power. See, e.g.,
Berman, supra note 50, at 1 (quoting Judge John S. Martin). Judge Martin stated:
"I find it most disturbing how much power Congress has ceded to the Justice De-
partment. This is a very dangerous system, when you give the U.S. Attorney that
much power and you have taken the discretion that should be in sentencing out of
the hands of [federal judges]." Id. (contending grant of power to DOJ excessive).
Similarly, Justice Kennedy stated:
Under the federal mandatory minimum statutes a sentence can be miti-
gated by a prosecutorial decision not to charge certain counts. There is
debate about this, but in my view a transfer of sentencing discretion from
ajudge to an Assistant U.S. Attorney, often not much older than the de-
fendant, is misguided. The policy gives the decision to an assistant prose-
cutor not trained in the exercise of discretion and takes discretion from
the trialjudge. The trial judge is the one actor in the system most exper-
ienced with exercising discretion in a transparent, open, and reasoned
way. Most of the sentencing discretion should be with the judge, not the
prosecutors.
Kennedy Address, supra note 1, at 5 (opposing shift of power from judges to
prosecutors).
122. See Vinegrad, supra note 41, at 315 (addressing Feeney Amendment's dis-
regard for Sentencing Commission). One commentator noted, "The Justice De-
partment has embarked on a mission to eviscerate the autonomy of the Sentencing
Commission in general .... I've never seen this kind of assault on the Sentencing
Commission before." Jonathon Groner, Sentencing Commission Panel Readies for Bat-
tle, N.Y.LJ., Aug. 20, 2003, at 1 (discussing shock of"attack" on Commission). For
a further discussion of the Commission's origin, see supra notes 17-23 and accom-
panying text.
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nored when Congress created the Feeney Amendment.1 23 The Commis-
sion was, however, disturbed greatly by the Amendment, with the
imposition of a new composition, new requirements and prohibitions.
The process of creating and amending the Guidelines was statutorily
granted to the Commission. 12 4 The Commission has the authority to peri-
odically review and revise the Guidelines after consulting with various play-
ers in the criminal justice system.15 Interested organizations, such as the
Federal Public Defenders and the U.S. Probation System, communicate to
the Commission any observations, comments or questions pertinent to the
maintenance of the Guidelines and, in addition, must submit annual re-
ports making suggestions to the Commission. 126 After voting, the Com-
mission submits the amendments to Congress, accompanied by a
statement of the reasons for the changes.12 7 Congress blatantly disre-
123. See Vinegrad, supra note 41, at 314-15 (describing Congress's avoidance
of Commission).
124. See 28 U.S.C. § 994 (2003) (establishing duties of Commission). The
Commission "shall promulgate and distribute to all courts of the United States and to
the United States Probation System-(1) guidelines, as described in this section, for
the use of a sentencing court in determining the sentence to be imposed in a
criminal case." Id. § 994(a)(1) (emphasis added) (stating authority to create
Guidelines); see also id. § 994(o) (granting Commission authority to revise
Guidelines).
125. See id. § 994(o) (providing procedure for revision of Guidelines). The
statute states:
The Commission periodically shall review and revise, in consideration of
comments and data coming to its attention, the guidelines promulgated
pursuant to the provisions of this section. In fulfilling its duties and exer-
cising its powers, the Commission shall consult with authorities on, and
individual and institutional representatives of, various aspects of the Fed-
eral criminal justice system.
Id. (giving Commission ability to revise Guidelines).
126. See id. (noting input from various aspects of criminal justice system im-
portant to functioning of Guidelines). The statute provides:
The United States Probation System, the Bureau of Prisons, the Judicial
Conference of the United States, the Criminal Division of the United
States Department of Justice, and a representative of the Federal Public
Defenders shall submit to the Commission any observations, comments,
or questions pertinent to the work of the Commission whenever they be-
lieve such communication would be useful, and shall, at least annually,
submit to the Commission a written report commenting on the operation
of the Commission's guidelines, suggesting changes in the guidelines that
appear to be warranted, and otherwise assessing the Commission's work.
Id. (providing procedure for receiving outside input for revising Guidelines).
127. See id. § 994(a)(1) (stating vote of at least four members needed); id.
§ 994(p) (setting procedure for submission of amendments to Congress). The
Commission must submit these amendments or modifications to previously sub-
mitted amendments before the first day of May during a regular session. See id.
(indicating time frame for submission). In addition, the Commission shall specify
a date the amendment shall take effect if approved by Congress. See id. (noting
effective date should be "no earlier than 180 days after being so submitted and no
later than the first day of November of the calendar year in which the amendment
or modification is submitted").
2004]
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garded the "predictable structure and reasoned process by which the
guidelines have been evaluated, administered and reformed."128
In addition, the composition of the Commission was altered to mini-
mize the participation of federal judges. 129 The Feeney Amendment fur-
ther prohibits the Commission from making any new downward departure
guidelines in the next two years. 130 Concurrently, it ordered the Commis-
sion to review the authorized grounds for downward departures and
amend the Guidelines and policy statements to ensure the incidence of
downward departures is substantially reduced within a 180-day time pe-
riod. 13 1 The Commission was required to do this regardless of whether it
believed this measure was necessary.1 32 The Commission received input
from the bench, the bar and other organizations to assist in its delibera-
tions through letters, reports and public hearings.' 3 3 While it could not
be predicted how the Commission would handle Congress's directive or
128. Vinegrad, supra note 41, at 315 (noting destruction of predictable pro-
cess for changes of Guidelines); see also Allenbaugh, supra note 4, at 11 ("In con-
trast [to Congress], an expert sentencing body such as the Commission can
continuously, dispassionately and scientifically evaluate sentencing trends, and do
so transparently, not privately, with input from the public, and proceed to adjust
what naturally must be considered an evolving body of law."); Martin, supra note
12, at A31 ("Congress has tried to micromanage the work of the commission and
has undermined its efforts to provide judges with some discretion in sentencing or
to ameliorate excessively harsh terms.").
129. See 28 U.S.C. § 991 (2003) (changing composition of Commission);
Groner, supra note 122, at 1 (noting change as "a slap at the commission, which
stung many judges"). For a further discussion of the composition change and its
effects on the judiciary, see supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
130. See 28 U.S.C. § 994 (limiting Commission). The statute prohibits the
Commission from adding any new grounds for downward departures in Part K of
Chapter V until May 1, 2005. See id. (imposing suspension of promulgating new
departures); see also Commission Sends Amendments to Congress, supra note 119 (dis-
cussing same).
131. See 28 U.S.C. § 994 (instructing Commission to evaluate Guidelines).
The Act gave the Commission a deadline of October 27, 2003 for this task. See
Commission Sends Amendments to Congress, supra note 119 (same). Diana E. Murphy,
Chair of the Commission, stated, "We certainly need your help with this directive
and are publishing related issues for comment and will have a public hearing in
late summer." Id. at 2 (inviting assistance in task).
132. See Vinegrad, supra note 41, at 315 (forcing Commission to make change
regardless of necessity).
133. See Groner, supra note 122, at 1 (noting Commission received input dur-
ing comment periods and public hearings). For example, on July 31, 2003, the
Federal Judges Association, an independent group that represents more than
ninety percent of federal district and appeals judges, told the Commission in a
comment that the Feeney Amendment should be repealed, stating, "Change can
be for the better. These changes were not." Id. In addition, the Practitioners'
Advisory Group, which is composed of criminal defense lawyers, suggested the
Commission should take "a modest approach" to cutting back departures. See id.
(providing input to Congress). The National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers (NACDL) also asked the Commission to "undertake a comprehensive re-
view of not only downward departures but also of those Guidelines which are so
unjust or illsuited [sic] that they lead judges to grant downward departures."
Goldman, supra note 42, at 4 (same).
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the pressures from the various members of the criminal justice commu-
nity, Congress formulated a new package of Guideline amendments now
awaiting final approval on or before May 1, 2004.134 The report encour-
ages significant limitations on departures. 135
VI. THE PROTECT Acr's GOOD INTENTIONS
Despite the contention produced by the Feeney Amendment, the
PROTECT Act was enacted with some good intentions. The legislation
dedicates with full force resources to protect our nation's children.1
3 6
Law enforcement's ability to prevent, investigate and punish violent
crimes against children has been comprehensively strengthened.1 3 7
The PROTECT Act establishes the America's Missing Broadcast Emer-
gency Response Alert bill ("AMBER Alert") to help locate and recover
134. See generally Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, USSC Acts to Reduce Down-
ward Departures, 35 THIRD BRANCH (Issue 10, Oct. 2003), available at http://
www.uscourts.gov/ttb/oct03ttb/ussc/index.html [hereinafter Downward Depar-
tures] (summarizing Commission's report). The president of the NACDL com-
mented that "[t]he Sentencing Commission is composed of decent and
conscientious members who.., are attempting to achieve a rational, workable and
fair sentencing structure. They have however, the swords of Congress at their
necks." Goldman, supra note 42, at 4. One commentator posed an important
question: "Will the Sentencing Commission withstand the Congressional pressure
to radically reduce the incidence of downward departures and instead promulgate
reasoned reforms that preserve judicial discretion?" Vinegrad, supra note 41, at
316 (questioning Commission's pending decision).
The report submitted by the Commission to Congress is over 177 pages in
length and provides substantial discussions on its decisions and includes several
charts and graphs. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: DowN-
WARD DEPARTURES FROM THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES (Oct. 2003), available
at http://www.ussc.gov/departrpt03/departrpt03.pdf (answering Feeney Amend-
ment's directive).
135. See generally Downward Departures, supra note 134 (summarizing Commis-
sion's report). The new package of amendments:
[P]rohibited departures based solely on the existence of plea agreement;
prohibited a number of existing grounds for downward departures: ac-
ceptance of responsibility, minor role in the offense, gambling addiction,
and legally-required restitution... ; limited the availability of a departure
based on family ties and responsibilities[,] aberrant behavior[,] and simi-
lar circumstances; significantly limited both the availability and the extent
of departures permissible for certain offenders with substantial criminal
history; implemented a directive authorizing limited departures pursuant
to early disposition (fast track) programs authorized by the Attorney Gen-
eral and the U.S. Attorney; emphasized throughout the guideline amend-
ment the requirement for courts to state with specificity their reasons for
departures in order to comply with the PROTECT Act and to facilitate
the USSC's ongoing monitoring of departure practice as well as appellate
review.
Id.
136. See DOJ, Fact Sheet: PROTECT Act (Apr. 30, 2003), at http://
www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2003/April/03-ag-266.htm [hereinafter DOJ Fact Sheet]
(providing list of problems and solutions addressed by PROTECT Act).
137. See id. (supporting effect of PROTECT Act on law enforcement's ability
to combat violence towards children).
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missing and abducted children.1 38 This bill supports national coordina-
tion of state and local AMBER Alert programs. 139 Most importantly, the
AMBER Alert system "galvanizes entire communities to assist law enforce-
ment in the time-sensitive search for and safe return of child victims." 1 40
National and state broadcast systems report abductions instantly upon re-
ceiving notification. 1 4 1 Information including any descriptions of the ab-
ductor and victim, vehicle model and license plate number, and any other
indicators are broadcasted. 142 A national coordinator was appointed and
substantial funds were provided to monitor and support AMBER Alert sys-
tems.' 4 3 The National Center for Missing and Exploited Children re-
ported that, as ofJanuary 27, 2004, over 122 children were recovered since
AMBER Alert's implementation. 144
Additionally, the Act provides new investigative tools to assist in de-
tecting and stopping child pornography. Law enforcement is now permit-
ted to use wiretaps, an important tool used in crimes involving the
Internet to lure children for sexual abuse and trafficking. 145 The Act en-
138. See id. (discussing solution to law enforcement having inadequate tools
to help locate missing children). The AMBER Alert bill honors Amber Hagerman,
who was kidnapped and murdered in Arlington, Texas, in 1996 at age nine. See
Vinegrad, supra note 41, at 310 (describing that AMBER Alert was "widely sup-
ported and provoked little controversy").
139. See DOJ Fact Sheet, supra note 136 (noting coordination of different
jurisdictions).
140. Id. Over eighty-nine plans exist nationwide. See id. (suggesting coordina-
tor working to develop "seamless nationwide child protection system in EVERY
state").
141. See Code Amber Found., The Web's Amber Alert System, at http://
codeamber.org/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2004) (providing information on AMBER
Alert). While each individual state program establishes its own criteria, the Na-
tional Center for Missing and Exploited Children suggests three criteria that
should be met before an alert is activated. See id. (detailing elements of effective
system). First, a child abduction is confirmed by law enforcement. See id. (listing
first criterion). Next, law enforcement must believe that the child is in danger of
serious bodily harm or death because of circumstances surrounding the abduction.
See id. (listing second criterion). Third, enough information concerning the ab-
duction must exist to believe an immediate broadcast would help. See id. (listing
third criterion). Typically, if the three criteria are met, alert information is put
together for public distribution over radio, television and the Internet. See id.
(demonstrating actions taken if criteria are met).
142. See id. (suggesting any information is helpful).
143. See DOJ Fact Sheet, supra note 136 (establishing guidance and funds for
program). On October 2, 2002, Attorney General John Ashcroft designated
Deborah Daniels, Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Justice Programs, to
serve as coordinator. See id. (appointing coordinator of AMBER Alert). A total of
twenty-five million dollars was provided in fiscal year 2004 for the states to build
and support the AMBER Alert system. See id. (affording monetary support).
144. See National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, AMBER Plan, at
http://www.missingkids.com/missingkids/servlet/PageServlet?LanguageCountry
=ENUS&Pageld=991 (last visited Jan. 27, 2004) (updating daily lives saved as re-
sult of PROTECT Act).
145. See id. (providing example of existing legal tools now used to combat full
range of crimes against children). Under prior law, wiretaps were not allowed for
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courages Internet service providers to voluntarily report child pornogra-
phy found on their systems. 14 6 Further, the PROTECT Act revises and
strengthens the prohibition on virtual child pornography, barring any ob-
scene materials depicting children. 14 7
Further, prosecutions for crimes against children can no longer be
barred by the statute of limitations because the PROTECT Act eliminated
the statute of limitations for abductions and physical or sexual abuse of
children. 148 Under previous law, the statute of limitations expired when
the victim turned twenty-five years old.14 9 This limit potentially allowed
offenders to go free if law enforcement could not solve the crime in
time.150 Similarly, under prior law, post-release supervision of sex offend-
ers was capped at five years.' 5 ' Now, any term of supervised release can be
imposed, including a term of life supervision, which is more appropriate
considering the high rate of recidivism for this type of crime. 152
The benefits of the PROTECT Act could have been achieved without
so severely limiting judges' discretion and without such a disruption of the
sentencing scheme. The PROTECT Act provides enhanced penalties for
alleged offenders. The legislation makes it more difficult for a person ac-
cused of a crime against children to attain bail.15 3 Increased sentences for
various crimes associated with luring children over the Internet. See id. (describing
change in law).
146. See id. (encouraging greater reporting of child pornography).
147. See id. (discussing child pornography over Internet). The Supreme
Court held in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition that a federal law that criminalized the
possession of "virtual" child pornography was unconstitutional. See 535 U.S. 234,
273 (2002) (discussing holding). Virtual child pornography includes materials
that depict minors engaging in sexual activity, but uses computer-generated
images instead of real children. See id. at 241-42 (describing Court's reasoning that
virtual pornography does not directly hurt children because children are not used
in its creation). This decision made it difficult for prosecutors to prove that child
pornography involved the use of real children, and therefore, defendants often
successfully avoided conviction by claiming there was reasonable doubt that the
computer image involved a real child. See id. at 254-55 (recognizing burden on
prosecution); see also DOJFact Sheet, supra note 136 (addressing difficulty of distin-
guishing virtual pornography from pornography involving actual children).
148. See PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650, 660 (2003) (codi-
fied as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3283 (2003)) (eliminating statute of limitations).
The statute provides that "[n]o statute of limitations that would otherwise pre-
clude prosecution for an offense involving the sexual or physical abuse, or kidnap-
ping, of a child under the age of 18 years shall preclude such prosecution during
the life of the child." Id.
149. See DOJ Fact Sheet, supra note 136 (noting former statute of limitations).
150. See id. (discussing prior implications of statute of limitations).
151. See id. (noting cap on post-release supervision).
152. See PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21. 117 Stat. 650, 651 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3583) (eliminating cap on term imposed); see also DOJFact
Sheet, supra note 136 (recognizing child sex offenders usually repeat crime).
153. See PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21. 117 Stat. 650, 660 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3142) (making attainment of bail more difficult).
2004]
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child abductors and child pornographers were also implemented.154 De-
spite being perceived as benefits by some, these changes made by the
PROTECT Act discordantly curtail the judiciary's authority to reduce
sentences and, therefore, force ajudge to treat each offender similarly.1 55
VII. CONCLUSION
Since its original proposal, the Feeney Amendment has been under
constant criticism. 156 The disapproval is mostly due to Congress's passage
of the Amendment without the benefit of full and balanced information
on the use and misuse of downward departures in federal sentencing. 157
The statistics utilized by Congress misrepresented downward departures as
overused, indicating a judiciary content in handing out lenient
sentences. 158 This legislation passed dubiously without any input or influ-
ence by the federal judiciary, the Sentencing Commission or other mem-
bers of the criminal justice system.1 59 While the federal sentencing
scheme is not without flaws and the Guidelines are not perfect in their
application, the drastic measures taken by the Feeney Amendment are
alarming. Accordingly, the opposition comes strong and committed to
remedying the effects of this controversial legislation.
A. The JUDGES Act: Possibility of Parole from the Feeney Amendment
On May 20, 2003, the Judicial Use of Discretion to Guarantee Equity
in Sentencing Act of 2003 ("JUDGES Act") 160 was introduced in Con-
gress.16 1 This bill, supported by several senators, is an effort to repeal the
provisions of the PROTECT Act, namely the Feeney Amendment, that do
154. See PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21. 117 Stat. 650, 652-56 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 111, 2251, 2251A, 2252, 2252A, 2422-23, 1591; 28 U.S.C.
§§ 994, 2423, 3559 (2003)) (increasing sentences); see also DOJFact Sheet, supra note
136 (detailing enhanced penalties).
155. See 18 U.S.C. § 3552 (2003) (removing judges' ability to depart down-
ward in cases involving children); 28 U.S.C. § 994 (2003) (same).
156. See Statements of Senators Edward M. Kennedy and Patrick Leahy Sup-
porting the JUDGES Act, supra note 16, at 372 ("The Judicial Conference of the
United States, the American Bar Association, the U.S. Sentencing Commission,
and many prosecutors, defense attorneys, law professors, civil rights organizations,
and business groups vigorously oppose [the Feeney Amendment]."). For further
discussion on criticism of the Feeney Amendment, see supra notes 1-5, 43-44 and
accompanying text.
157. For further discussion on the Feeney Amendment's adoption, see supra
notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
158. For further discussion of statistics considered, see supra note 63.
159. For further discussion on the lack of stakeholder input, see supra notes
43-44 and accompanying text.
160. H.R. 2213, 108th Cong. (2003).
161. See Vinegrad, supra note 41, at 316 (indicating Senator Edward M. Ken-
nedy and Representative John Conyers, Jr. introduced bill).
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not specifically deal with the exploitation of children. 162 One senator
commented that the Feeney Amendment has "nothing to do with protect-
ing children, and everything to do with handcuffing judges and eliminat-
ing fairness in our federal sentencing system."'
6 3
If passed, the JUDGES Act would effectively repeal the provisions of
the Feeney Amendment. 164 Conceding that the Guidelines and sentenc-
ing structure may need reform, the JUDGES Act requires the Commission
to report on the incidence of downward departures. 16 5 The JUDGES Act
requires the Commission to submit the report to Congress within 180 days
of its passage. 166 The report shall include: a history of departures in the
federal sentencing system, an extensive study of variations of departure
rates per districts and circuits, a comparison between federal and state
departure authority, an analysis of district judges' grounds for departures,
a review of departure appeals and assessments extensively covering depar-
tures and their promotion of the federal sentencing scheme.1 6 7 The Com-
mission is also required to hold at least one public hearing to solicit views
of interested parties on the topic.
1 68
Such a report, had it been done and relied upon, would have been
useful to Congress when considering the Feeney Amendment and may
have justified its adoption. 169 The goal is that if the JUDGES Act goes into
effect, the report will provide Congress with a solid basis for further ac-
tion. 170 If the report suggests that judges are abusing their discretion and
granting too many departures, then and only then will Congress be justified
162. See Statements of Senators Edward M. Kennedy and Patrick Leahy Sup-
porting the JUDGES Act, supra note 16, at 372 (providing motivation for bill pro-
posal). Additionally, in September 2003, the Judicial Conference voted to support
repealing the controversial amendments to the PROTECT Act. See Admin. Office
of the U.S. Courts, Judicial Conference Seeks Restoration of Judges' Sentencing Authority,
35 THIRD BRANCH (Issue 10, Oct. 2003), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/
oct03ttb/restoration/index.html (setting forth support provisions needing
repeal).
163. Statements of Senators Edward M. Kennedy and Patrick Leahy Support-
ing the JUDGES Act, supra note 16, at 372.
164. See H.R. 2213, 108th Cong. § 3 (2003) (repealing Feeney Amendment of
PROTECT Act).
165. See id. § 2 (requiring report issued by Commission to Congress).
166. See id. § 2(a) (setting deadline for report).
167. See id. § 2(b) (1)-(10) (providing specific content desired in report).
168. See id. § 2(c) (requiring public hearing to solicit views). Recommended
views to solicit include those of the federal judiciary, DOJ and the defense bar. See
id. § 2(c)(2) (naming parties from whom Commission should solicit input).
169. For further discussion of considerations in passing the Sentencing Re-
form Act, see supra note 16.
170. See Statements of Senators Edward M. Kennedy and Patrick Leahy Sup-
porting the JUDGES Act, supra note 16, at 373 (noting report will justify subse-
quent action by Congress).
29
Stappert: A Death Sentence for Justice: The Feeney Amendment Frustrates Fed
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2004
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
in limiting that discretion. 17 1 If it is revealed that judges should be given
more discretion, then Congress should so provide. 172
B. Impact
Precisely how each actor in the system will respond to the Feeney
Amendment or operate under its confines is unpredictable. 17 3 One un-
fortunate result has already transpired: good judges are tossing in their
gavels and leaving the bench out of frustration. 174 The HonorableJohn S.
Martin, Jr., a federal district judge, announced his resignation only two
months after the Feeney Amendment's enactment. 17 5  The judge
remarked:
For a judge to be deprived of the ability to consider all of the
factors that go into formulating a just sentence is completely at
odds with the sentencing philosophy that has been a hallmark of
the American system of justice .... I no longer want to be part
of our unjust criminal justice system. 176
Hopefully, this retreat from the bench will be isolated and limited.177 The
message, however, along with those of many other judges voicing their
concerns and refusing to be intimidated by the Act, must be clearly
heard. 178
171. See id. (showing objective report might direct decreased judicial
discretion).
172. See id. (same).
173. See Vinegrad, supra note 41, at 316 (presuming reactions will result and
questioning response by each actor).
174. See Martin, supra note 12, at A31 (illustratingjudge leaving in response to
legislation).
175. See Controversial Memo, supra note 31 (explaining PROTECT Act caused
judge to leave bench).
176. Id. Judge Martin pointed out every sentence of imprisonment imposed
not only affects the defendant but also the lives of innocent family members. See
id. (acknowledging other sentencing considerations).
177. See id. (hoping response to legislation would not involve judges leaving
bench). The Honorable Myron H. Bright of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit, in his concurring opinion in United States v. Flores, urged district
judges to use their opinions to disclose their views about the "injustice in the sen-
tencing decision or decisions [they] are obligated to impose by Congressional
mandate and/or the Sentencing Guidelines." 336 F.3d 760, 767 (8th Cir. 2003)
(Bright, J., concurring). ChiefJudge Marilyn Hall Patel of the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of California commented that "the wisdom of the years
and breadth of the experience accumulated by judges and the Sentencing Com-
mission in adjudicating criminal cases and sentencing defendants is chucked for
the inexperience of young prosecutors and the equally young think-tank policy
makers in the legislative and executive branches." Controversial Memo, supra note
31 (criticizing PROTECT Act).
178. See Talk Left, New York's Federal Judges Protest Sentencing Law Changes, at
http://talkleft.com/new-archives/004577.html#004577 (last visited Apr. 19, 2004)
(acknowledging efforts of U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second CircuitJudge John
M. WalkerJr. and twenty-six other judges around country issuing statement calling
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Additionally, one can only hope that the steady erosion of judges'
discretion in federal sentencing will come to a swift conclusion. 179 While
only time will reveal its long-term effect, the Feeney Amendment stands as
a significant and unwelcome development in federal sentencing law.
180
Unfortunately, sometimes "U]ustice is incidental to law and order."
1 8
'
Patrice Stappert
for repeal of Feeney Amendment and encouraging "judges from around the coun-
try [to] follow the example of these outspoken New York jurists and just say no' to
Feeney").
179. See Vinegrad, supra note 41, at 316 (offering desire that judges regain
discretion).
180. See id. (contending legislation disfavored).
181. LAwYER: JOKES, QuoTEs, AND ANECDOTES 264 (Patrick Regan ed., 2001)
(quoting former FBI DirectorJ. Edgar Hoover).
31
Stappert: A Death Sentence for Justice: The Feeney Amendment Frustrates Fed
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2004
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49: p. 693
32
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 49, Iss. 3 [2004], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol49/iss3/7
